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CONGRESSIONAL TASK FORCE ON AFGHANISTAN

HEARING

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**Washington, D.C.
April 30, 1986**

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Hearing

CONGRESSIONAL TASK FORCE ON AFGHANISTAN

Task Force Members Present:

SENATOR GORDON J. HUMPHREY (Presiding)
SENATOR MALCOLM WALLOP
REPRESENTATIVE CHARLES WILSON

9:22 a.m., Wednesday
April 30, 1986

Hearing Room 608
Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C.

P R O C E E D I N G S

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Good morning. I want to welcome our distinguished witnesses to this fifth in a series of hearings of the Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan.

Our subject today is the UN-sponsored peace negotiations on Afghanistan. These are indirect or "proximity" talks between Pakistan and the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul. With the seventh round of UN talks scheduled to begin on May 5th, and alluded to in press reports as potentially the last, today's hearing is particularly timely.

I want to offer some opinions in my opening remarks on the nature and details of these talks. As to the nature, they are talks from which legitimate representatives of the Afghan people, the Mujahideen, have been excluded. It seems to me for the United States to sanction negotiations to which no legitimate Afghan is a representative is high-handed and arrogant. To sanction negotiations that would decide the fate of the Afghan people, while excluding legitimate representatives of the Afghan people, is, in my view, immoral.

With regard to the terms so far agreed upon, according to press reports, I suggest that the State Department has made a very grave error in offering to guarantee the

terms of the settlement. And I implore the administration to keep the State Department in hand in the weeks and months ahead.

I would remind the administration of the unspeakable suffering and sacrifice of the Afghan people over the last six years in a brave effort to rid their nation of unpopular regimes and of the Soviet armed forces.

Let us not throw away that monumental sacrifice.

According to the press, foreign assistance to the freedom fighters would be terminated at once under the agreements. In addition, Pakistan would immediately recognize the puppet government in Kabul. Soviet withdrawal, however, would be a phased process.

These terms, in my view, are a trap. These terms constitute a sell-out of the Mujahideen, for it takes no vivid imagination to see how things would work out: the Soviets would withdraw enough of their forces to make a good show, but the Kabul regime, now legitimized by the formal recognition of Pakistan, would soon enough invite the Soviet troops to remain, claiming that the Mujahideen are still receiving outside assistance.

And what would we and other concerned nations do in

response? What could we do? Once the program of assistance is shut down, it will be very difficult to resume. And for Pakistan resumption of aid to the Mujahideen might be politically impossible.

The result? The Soviets and their puppets in Kabul will have succeeded in their aim to incorporate Afghanistan into the Soviet empire.

At the least, over the next several weeks and months, the United States must strongly make the case for simultaneity in the cut-off of aid to the Mujahideen and the withdrawal of Soviet forces.

The upcoming talks in Geneva, and our policy with regard to that process, are matters of critical concern.

I hope that today's witnesses can help to address the questions posed by this complex and difficult issue.

I would announce that Senator Bradley, our third witness, is in the Finance Committee mark-up on tax reform, a matter in which he has vital concern; he will join us as he is able.

Congressman Wilson, do you have an opening statement?

REPRESENTATIVE WILSON: No, I don't.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Our witnesses this morning are Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick and Dr. Edward Luttwak, in addition to Senator Bradley.

Welcome, each and all, and, Madam Ambassador, if you would lead off.

STATEMENTS OF HON. BILL BRADLEY,
SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW
JERSEY; JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK,
FORMER U. S. REPRESENTATIVE TO
THE UNITED NATIONS; AND EDWARD
LUTTWAK, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC
AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Thank you very much, Senator Humphrey and Representative Wilson. I am most honored to be here this morning and to participate in this discussion of the Afghanistan Task Force on this most vitally important humanitarian and geopolitical-strategic issue at this most crucial moment in its development.

I would like to begin my comments with a question. The question is whether there is really in the U. S. government any American official who believes that the government of Afghanistan will negotiate an agreement which will provide for the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the end to the flow of external arms into Afghanistan, and internal reconciliation based on negotiations between the warring parties and the restoration of democracy and human rights for all Afghans.

And I put that question because those were precisely the terms which our President, Ronald Reagan, proposed in his important and sober speech before the United Nations General Assembly this past October.

President Reagan at that time asserted that negotiations between the warring parties in what the State Department calls "regional conflicts"--in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia--were a starting point--and those were the President's words--starting point of a process of internal reconciliation that should lead to--and I quote--"verified elimination of foreign military presence and end to the flow of outside arms, and internal reconciliation with democracy and human rights for all."

Now, the President has more than once spoken of direct negotiation between the warring parties in these murderous struggles in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia as the starting point. He has asserted that a peace process ending in internal reconciliation, with human rights and democracy for all, is the goal of the U. S. government and our terms for settlement.

But what has happened? As we all know, there are no negotiations under way between the warring parties. To

the contrary, the government of Afghanistan has steadfastly refused to deal with what they call the "bandit" leaders of the Mujahideen.

There was an interesting comment in Pravda at the time of the President's speech, and, again, before the summit and several times since then, in which Pravda put the question--and I quote: Why does the Soviet Union not persuade the governments of Afghanistan and Nicaragua to "sit down at the conference table with the Mujahideen and the Contras, respectively?" Pravda said this is the question with which American and western journalists were continually badgering them. And they said they know the answer already--and I quote: "First, the question of what kind of talks to conduct and with whom should be resolved by the governments of these sovereign states themselves. And, second, with whom is it proposed that they should conduct the talks? With hired assassins and bandits who have lost their human aspect?" And I quote.

Thus does Pravda dehumanize the brave men who struggle for the right of self-determination and the independence of their nation in Afghanistan: "...hired assassins and bandits who have lost their human aspect."

One can ask: How can a negotiated peace be achieved if the warring parties refuse to negotiate? That is really the question which we have been addressing.

And the answer seems to be that it can be negotiated by ignoring the parties to the conflict, or at least one of the parties to the conflict.

We seem to have been operating on the theory that some negotiations are better than no negotiations, and so the UN has organized proximity talks, as you know, which bring together the representatives of Pakistan, which does not recognize diplomatically the puppet government of Afghanistan, the so-called DRA--Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, which is, I might add, neither democratic nor republican nor even Afghan in its composition--and those talks have, as we know, and as you mentioned, reached a fairly crucial stage. The Soviets' position with regard to the talks has been as clearcut and as steadfast and straightforward as their position with regard to all aspects of the Afghan conflict. They have simply asserted that the only problem in Afghanistan is caused by those who resist subjugation and the incorporation of their country into the Soviet empire.

A not-so-subtle campaign has been under way really

since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 to make the United States appear as the villain in Afghanistan, and to therefore obscure the reality of the Soviet war against the Afghan people. They haven't been wholly successful in this, of course, because too many people know that one-third of the Afghan nation have been forced to flee their homes and to live as refugees either in or outside their country in very cruel circumstances. The suffering of the Afghan people has been too thoroughly documented, as has the heroism of the Afghan freedom fighters.

This last fall, I would recall, the United Nations Special Rapporteur, who is a man of unusual courage, Professor Felix Ermacora, wrote in his report: "There is no doubt that the current situation in Afghanistan has given rise to willful killing, including murder, torture, and inhuman treatment, denial of fair trial, arbitrary arrest and execution of sentences, the taking of hostages."

Some of that misery described by Dr. Ermacora was caused, of course, by the fact that the Soviets have, since the accession of Premier Gorbachev, stepped up their war in Afghanistan against the Afghan people.

Nonetheless, in spite of the really quite blatantly

clear facts, Soviet spokesmen continue to insist that the misery is really caused by those who resist. The Soviet Union is still claiming that the 120,000 Soviet troops who fight today in Afghanistan were invited into that country to help combat the "reactionary clique" surrounding Hafizullah Amin, who was, of course, murdered by a special Soviet assault team on their arrival in Afghanistan. It's always been ironic, at best, to wonder about a man who invited in the Soviet troops, who murdered him as their first act. Of course, we could all be certain that Amin did no such thing and that the Soviet troops arrived just as they seemed to, namely, in a simple, clear, straightforward invasion.

Since then, the Soviet Union claims that their forces remain in Afghanistan only to protect Afghanistan from--and I quote--"the outside interference of the United States, French, Pakistanis, and Chinese whose guns and lies seek to confuse and slay the Afghan people."

The Soviets' position has been, and remains: if only the state terrorists of these countries--the United States, France, Pakistan, China--would cease their interference, then the Soviet forces might some day withdraw and Afghans could live in peace.

[] So far really only the most faithful client states of the Soviet Union--and, regrettably, Prime Minister Rajid Gandhi--seem to have been persuaded by the Soviet argument that the United States is the principal obstacle to peace in Afghanistan.

As you know--but it is always worth remembering--even the UN General Assembly voted last year 122 to 19 to repeat once more its call for a withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan.

[] But the Soviets have not been deterred by the skepticism with which their claims are met, and they continue to insist down to today that the United States in general, and "reactionary cliques" as well elsewhere, are directly responsible for the crimes that the Mujahideen commit--they call the very existence of the Mujahideen, of course, a crime--and they assert, and I quote again: "This is state terrorism in its most cynical and overt form."

[] The President's proposal for internal reconciliation, which the President has offered repeatedly, including at the United Nations General Assembly, has been described by Soviet spokesmen as, and I quote, "nothing else than an attempt at justifying the interference of the United States

and the countries that depend on it."

And so the Soviets and the Afghan government have remained absolutely unmoved and uninterested in the process of internal reconciliation proposed by the President and reiterated by him.

Meanwhile, Moscow has reiterated that an end to the conflict in Afghanistan could only come after the end of support by the west and China and Pakistan and everyone of the Mujahideen fighting inside Afghanistan for their homeland. And they have insisted that there could not even be discussion of a timetable for Soviet withdrawal until all western support for the Mujahideen had ceased.

As you know, the government of Pakistan, which has endured very heavy burdens of millions of Afghan refugees--and, more recently, has incurred repeated violations of its border by the Soviet Union, by aerial attacks, for example, across the Pakistan border, bombing attacks inside Pakistan--has been under a variety of increasing pressures, including military pressure directly with cross-border attacks, but also increasing threats from Afghanistan and India; a very clear effort at strengthening the relations between India and Afghanistan, which has heightened Pakistan's fears of

encirclement; and deliberate efforts recently made, as we understand, by the governments of Afghanistan and India, probably, and the Soviet Union to exacerbate tribal rivalries and ethnic tensions within Pakistan.

Meanwhile, internal political problems in Pakistan, including the development of an opposition, the PPP, that advocates settlement and the repatriation of all Afghan refugees, and uncertainty, I believe, about the strength and reliability of the American commitment, have constituted combined pressure on the government of Pakistan that has led some to fear that the government of Pakistan may accept, in the new round of talks which are about to get under way next week in Geneva, conditions which it has heretofore declined to accept.

Those proximity talks have, of course, called for the safe repatriation--safe return home--of more than 4 million Afghan refugees now living in Pakistan and Iran, and for international guarantees of Afghan neutrality and for pledges of non-interference in the internal affairs of others.

The Secretary-General's Special Representative, Diego Cordovez, has asserted some time back that three of the four treaties proposed for this settlement have already been

essentially agreed to, and that only the questions of a timetable for withdrawal of Soviet troops and the prerequisite American guarantees constitute obstacles today to a full settlement.

Now, as you know, the UN Representative has asserted that great progress has been made on these questions, and that he is quite hopeful of a breakthrough at these upcoming meetings. He announced last month that both Afghanistan and Pakistan have accepted a new draft proposal on the withdrawal of Soviet troops as a basis for talks this month, and that this constitutes a very dramatic advance in these negotiations. He asserted: "I believe we have produced a good basis for discussion, one that has included the positions of both sides, that is balanced, and which could lead to an effective settlement."

And, perhaps, the disturbing aspect of this is that, simultaneously virtually with Diego Cordovez's assurances of the great progress that has been made, the Soviet Union noted that "The Afghan side declared again that it firmly proceeds from the view that the main contents of the settlement must be a complete end to armed interference and any other outside interference in the internal affairs of

Afghanistan, and their guaranteed non-resumption."

The Soviet Union has, of course, endorsed this demand of the Afghan government and expressed its best wishes for hopeful talks that will arrive at this happy condition.

The Afghan news has, meanwhile, noted that the current formulations do not include a reference to self-determination; they omit any reference to self-determination in the terms of the agreement and the proposed settlement, and note that it is, of course, unthinkable that an agreement would be reached without the presence of the representatives of the Afghan people, namely, the Mujahideen, and without providing the Afghan people the self-determination which they and all people deserve.

I think, Mr. Chairman, that it is quite clear that the Soviet Union seeks today in Afghanistan to solve the problem of tragic war and conquest by the elimination of resistance, and hopes to do this by securing from the United States our guarantees that we will provide no assistance to those who resist the authority of the so-called Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and that we will do our best to ensure that no other country provides such assistance.

There are several ironies in the very suggestion.

The most important one seems to me to be the irony that the Soviet Union should hope that the United States, which is committed from its founding to the proposition that legitimate government rests on consent, would serve to guarantee the conquest of the Afghan people by a government which was conceived in force and which governs by force and with the support of external force as well.

Doubtless, I believe, the model for this agreement in fact remains the Kennedy-Krushchev settlement which ended the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, and in which the United States, in return for some promises which have since been broken, promised not to seek to oppose or to permit others to oppose the government of Cuba. It is inconceivable to me that the American government should provide such guarantees of tyranny without even objections of those who are subjugated.

It would obviously be a violation of our principles and of our policies, and I have every confidence that the American government, confronted with any agreement which calls upon us to accept the denial of self-determination and the reality of conquest of the people of Afghanistan--the American government will refuse such an agreement and will

withdraw any such guarantees which may have been made contingent upon different types of agreement.

Certainly I have no question but that President Reagan, who has been extremely clear about the conditions for the end to these regional conflicts, will reject any such role for the United States out of hand and without really much further consideration.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Thank you, Madam Ambassador, for your excellent testimony.

I hope that your confidence that the United States would withdraw its guarantee, absent some equitable means for self-determination to be achieved by the Afghan people--I hope that confidence is warranted. I am frankly very uneasy on that point. Mr. Gorbachev is a very clever politician, a very clever propagandist--he has some new peace proposal every day, it would seem, and I think he would quickly put us in an embarrassing position if we sought to withdraw our guarantee of UN-sponsored terms arising out of UN-sponsored talks. That, of course, might or might not be a future event.

But I am not as confident that we are in a position

to withdraw--I am not confident that we are in a position to withdraw comfortably our offer to guarantee, and that is a very worrisome point. I fear that we are being maneuvered into a situation where momentum is building daily and weekly towards settlement on the terms, as we understand them from press accounts.

Madam Ambassador, you stated that the negotiations so far have ignored one of the principal parties to the conflict. Another way of putting that is that we have left out of these negotiations a legitimate representative of the Afghan people in the decision about the fate of their country.

Is that something that Americans should feel uncomfortable about? Is that something our government should feel uncomfortable about and be seeking to rectify?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I believe so. That's the reason, Senator Humphrey, that I began my remarks by a reference to the President's proposal at the UN General Assembly, which proposal the President has reiterated in some other context.

The President has been very clear that only the parties to the conflict are finally morally and politically

situated to undertake negotiations to end those conflicts.

Now, I cannot understand how we could feel otherwise than exceedingly embarrassed to be party to negotiations in which the principal parties to the conflict, one of the principal parties to the conflict, the most legitimate representatives of the Afghan people, is denied even the opportunity to participate in discussions which would settle their fate.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Madam Ambassador, would you permit us to suspend and go to Senator Bradley's testimony? He has to return to the Finance Committee.

Welcome, Senator Bradley, thank you for coming.

SENATOR BRADLEY: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to be with you this morning and talk about this very important issue.

Six years ago Soviet armed forces invaded Afghanistan, killed the President and installed a puppet regime. Since then, the occupation has grown in size and brutality. Supported by tanks, artillery, and air power, Soviet troops have increased to about 120,000; Soviet losses already exceed 30,000.

In the last few months, the Soviets and their

Afghan puppets have conducted the most intensive offense of the war. Despite overwhelming odds, the Afghan resistance has continued its extraordinary war of liberation; the resistance is more effective than ever before. As a result, neither side has been able to defeat the other. Today, an increasingly violent stalemate exists.

The war has inflicted great hardship on the Afghan people. Indiscriminate carpet bombing has levelled entire villages, whole populations have been massacred. Faced with the prospect of mass starvation, millions of Afghans have fled to neighboring Pakistan; some 4 million people, a third of the population are in exile.

This is not the first time that the Soviet Union has resorted to genocide to secure its political ends. In 1932, Stalin manufactured a famine in the Ukraine to crush peasant opposition to collectivization. More than 5 million people starved to death, though, to this very day, the Soviet government denies that this tragedy ever took place.

And then, at the end of World War II, Moscow suppressed Baltic freedom fighters by destroying their economic base and deporting half a million people to Siberia.

The genocide in Afghanistan is one more appalling

episode in the historical pattern of Soviet terror, and the world must now forcefully oppose it.

So far, the United States has paid lip service to the Afghan resistance's goal of national liberation and self-determination, but our country's actions are based on the worst-case presumption that the Soviet Union will ultimately prevail. This misplaced pessimism ill-serves the Afghan cause at a time when the resistance is not only continuing to fight, but improving its capabilities in achieving greater political cohesion.

The resistance has begun to demonstrate a capacity not only for protracted guerrilla warfare, but also for using modern methods of communication to coordinate largescale counterattacks. Meanwhile, disparate tribal and religious groups have merged into an alliance of seven major parties. The members of this alliance are rapidly developing a modern concept of an independent neutral Islamic state as the unifying principle of their struggle. They are beginning to supplement their increasingly effective military logistics and support operations with new civil service and administrative functions, especially health care and education, that could form the basis of a full-fledged government.

To sustain these domestic gains and rally international support for its struggle, the alliance is taking concrete steps to establish itself as the legitimate unified representative of the Afghan people in bodies such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the United Nations.

Last fall, during a visit to America, alliance spokesmen announced plans to open offices in New York and other major cities around the world. These are important developments that merit the support of all free nations.

On a practical level, supporting the alliance means recognizing it as the sole legitimate representative of the Afghan people. It means backing its claim to Afghanistan's seat at the Islamic Conference, which suspended Afghanistan's membership immediately after the invasion, and helping it to pave the way ultimately for United Nations membership.

Most important, America must refuse to guarantee any negotiated settlement to which the legitimate representatives of the Afghan people are not a party, or which calls for American non-intervention as a prerequisite for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

We must make greater efforts to focus world atten-

tion on the Afghan genocide and the resistance's heroic refusal to give in. We should let people of the Soviet Union know the glaring contradiction between Secretary Gorbachev's talk of peace and his acts of war.

The peace process sponsored by the United Nations can and should be productive, but it may also be protracted. In the meantime, the U. S. must be prepared to maintain solidarity not only with the heroic Afghan resistance movement, but also with Pakistan and its supporters in the Islamic world.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for giving me the chance to come in on a very, very hectic schedule, in the midst of tax mark-up crises, to make this statement before this hearing, and I appreciate your willingness to allow me to come in and to appear with these distinguished witnesses.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Thank you, Senator Bradley. Do you have time for one quick question?

SENATOR BRADLEY: I really don't, Mr. Chairman. If you must, you must, but ---

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Well, you note that the United States should refuse to guarantee any negotiated settlement to which legitimate representatives of the Afghan people are

not a party. We have already done that, unless we withdraw our offer to guarantee.

What do you have to say on that point?

SENATOR BRADLEY: Well, I think that the United States should not ultimately support a resolution of a negotiation that doesn't take into consideration not only Soviet actions in the past but also the legitimate aspirations of the Afghan people.

REPRESENTATIVE WILSON: Senator Bradley, when you get back to the Finance Committee and you start thinking about the depletion allowance, ---

SENATOR BRADLEY: You want a tax credit for what?

REPRESENTATIVE WILSON: --- I'd like for you to remember that we are already broke in Texas.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Just report it out, no amendments.

SENATOR BRADLEY: Okay, thank you.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Thank you, Madam Ambassador, for permitting that--I don't want to say disruption--pause, that pause in your response to the questions.

Getting back to this matter of the lack of a legitimate representative, there is no question--and, for that

matter, the terms of the agreement so far--there is no question the President's heart is in the right place in this matter. But I've been told by a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State that the President had not signed off on the terms of these agreements so far.

My concern is that much of this is going on even beneath the level of the Secretary of State, not to mention beneath the level of the Office of the President.

Can you shed any light on the involvement, inasmuch as you have knowledge of the structure of the State Department--can you shed any light on the involvement of the State Department offices and how this is working its way through the Executive?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Well, I think, to the best of my knowledge, in what might be called a routine fashion, which is to say that the general policy is made up by the President and the Secretary of State through such declarations as the UN speech of the President. And it is left to the bureaus, the regional bureaus, and desk officers to formulate the specific U. S. policy with regard, for example, to the U. S. role in the so-called proximity talks, and also the U. S. response.

Now, it was, as I understand it from the Department, the decision of the bureau, but with obviously the appropriate authorization of presumably the Under Secretary of State and, quite possibly, I would suppose, the Secretary of State, that the decision was made to offer oral guarantees before the December meeting. It was, of course, at the time asserted publicly--and I have nothing but public knowledge of this--that there was grave concern about whether there might not be an outcry in the United States by supporters of the Afghan freedom fighters against any such guarantees.

Now the idea of guarantees has become thoroughly familiar to everyone, but I don't think the concern of many of us has diminished.

My understanding of that, Senator Humphrey, is that the policy was all made in a very routine fashion, but also I think that the final U. S. guarantees and final U. S. positions could not be adopted without their being presented to the President and without knowledge by the President of these events.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Congressman Wilson?

REPRESENTATIVE WILSON: Yes, I've got a couple of comments to make and then a very general question for both of

you in light of Senator Humphrey's last question.

I've sort of had the role of the day-to-day follow-through on some of the programs that have been covert, but also the programs that have been signed off on by the President that have appeared in the paper for humanitarian aid. And I think I can shed a little light on your last question, Senator, and on Ambassador Kirkpatrick's reply.

What are there, 240 million Americans now about? Well, there are 240 million Americans that would like to provide humanitarian assistance to the Afghan freedom fighters, particularly morphine for amputations and such things as that; there are five Americans who would not like to do this. Unfortunately, those five all are in positions in the State Department where they can cause serious, serious problems.

And when the President made the \$7 million available that we were able to reprogram from an old Syrian or Lebanese program, the State Department put their very best blocker and delayer in charge of that program to make sure that it never happened and to make sure that there was always a very good answer for why it couldn't be done legally.

But I might say that, because of some of our position on the Foreign Operations Subcommittee, we had them by

the throat and they finally had to get rid of Ambassador Helman.

I would also like to point out that there is vital concern among the Afghan freedom fighters. There have been a lot of accusations, as we all know, that the Pakistanis have been cutting the deck on arms. Now, I personally, with seven trips to Peshawar--and sometimes the boundaries get hard to identify--I know that's not true. There has been a considerable amount of ratholing of weapons by different groups of the Mujahideen--and that's for two reasons. One is that they really and truly believe they are going to drive the Soviets out--they believe it. And I also believe it, under certain circumstances.

So they are ratholing for two reasons. The least important reason is that when they do drive the Soviets out, they plan on having to fight each other for domination--the fundamentalists versus the moderates, etcetera.

But the main reason that they are ratholing guns and ammunition is in preparation for the day that the United States bugs out. And I think that is a very important thing for us to remember.

Also--and I am so sorry Senator Bradley had to

leave, and I was so happy to hear his testimony--but I would say to him, as I've said to Senator Glenn and to several other members of the Senate, that the absolute irreplaceable necessity in this effort is Pakistani confidence, Pakistani confidence that they can make it expensive for the Russians on cross-border, Pakistani confidence that they can't just be bullied by India, who the Russians would like to get to bully them, to create torment in their country. And that we shouldn't, in our aid to Pakistan, try to apply standards that we wouldn't otherwise apply, and we should give them the confidence to move forward with their extremely dangerous and courageous actions that they have taken in the face of probably the most serious intimidation since Finland was Finlandized.

Now, this is my question to both of you--and it's a very serious question, and it is one that is being debated now. As you all know, the alliance is very fragile; there are seven members of the alliance. We have encouraged the alliance, the Pakistanis have encouraged the alliance. The alliance is being embraced pretty much by the moderates and by the moderate fundamentalists, for lack of a better word, and viewed with some suspicion among the fundamentalists.

But this is what I want to know what you think of. When I was last there in February, it was suggested to me, in the presence of one of the fundamentalist leaders--not the most fundamentalist leader, but a fundamentalist leader--that it would be an extremely constructive thing if we could raise in the United States \$2 million--privately, not from the government--to construct a headquarters in Peshawar for the alliance, where there would be a flag and a guard and the various amenities that would add legitimacy, that as much of our aid, particularly humanitarian aid and food, as possibly could, be addressed to the alliance, and the alliance have the responsibility for the disbursement thereof. And we thought we could probably do that with around a million bucks, and that we take another million and provide for consulates to be opened in New York, Paris, London, and Los Angeles, for instance--and, since we plan on raising most of the money in Texas, we might have to open one in Houston.

This would accomplish two things, in my view--but I want your view. It would allow Senator Humphrey and I and others to raise a lot of hell with the administration about recognizing the legitimate government, about withdrawing recognition from Kabul--and I worry every day about our

diplomats in Kabul, and I don't understand why in the world we maintain--I don't think we get any intelligence out of that embassy and I don't know why it's there, and we know it's an illegitimate government--so this would give us leverage to insist on recognition.

But more than that, it would seem to me, if we had a viable alliance that was respected as representative of the people, and if we had offices in the major western capitals of the world where people could go for information and go to see how they could help--young doctors could go to volunteer, and all the rest--that we would then be in a very strong position to demand and to insist on a vote in the United Nations, to give the Afghans' seat in the United Nations to the legitimate representatives of the Afghan people--and, as a side effect, it might be an area in which this would bring about a better relationship between us and all of the various Moslem countries, who I believe would support this to a man, including Libya and Iran and--perhaps not Syria, but everybody else.

Now, what would be the downside of that, and would that be a good idea? And I'd like to address it to both of you--you first, Madam Ambassador.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Yes, thank you, Representative Wilson. I would like to agree with almost all aspects of the analysis which you have just offered, including the proposal concerning a headquarters for the alliance. I believe that it is extremely useful and appropriate and desirable to establish such headquarters for the alliance, and to support diplomatic representation, diplomatic activities, for the alliance.

I think this is the kind of diplomatic and political support that the Soviets regularly offer to the most unpleasant so-called national liberation movements, and here there is a real authentic national liberation movement which lacks just this kind of diplomatic and political support. I think it would be wholly appropriate for us.

I do agree with you that it would create a problem, clearly a conflict, with our policy of continued recognition of the so-called Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. I frankly find our policies strange and incomprehensible virtually with regard to the continued recognition of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. I see no advantages whatsoever in our maintenance of diplomatic relations with the so-called DRA, and many disadvantages.

I have one caveat, and I do believe it is important that, were such a policy to be established, the alliance not be used as a means of favoring some groups within the Afghan resistance movement at the expense of other groups within the Afghan resistance movement. I think there is a temptation to do this on the part of the U. S. government, and sometimes we succumb to those temptations. And I think that, too, constitutes a kind of denial of self-determination to the Afghan people.

I agree with you that there would be a good opportunity for working with Moslem nations on this problem, and a reasonable chance that there would in fact finally be recognition of the alliance as the legitimate representatives of the Afghan people by the United Nations.

Finally, I would only say that all of this would have to be done very quickly, not because I think the resistance is about to collapse, but because the relentless Soviet imperial propaganda campaign serves as a basis for their incremental gains through just such processes as the proximity talks, and obviously it would be totally impossible for us both to support such an alliance policy and fulfill any role in the proximity talks such as that now foreseen.

REPRESENTATIVE WILSON: Dr. Luttwak?

DR. LUTTWAK: I agree, in turn, with Ambassador Kirkpatrick that your analysis is very persuasive. I think that we can all anticipate a protracted conflict here, unless indeed the Soviet Union succeeds in maneuvering us out of this conflict. And I believe actually that in the long term it will not be possible to sustain the aid and support that the Afghan cause requires unless it is indeed legitimized, it is provided not merely with the formal trappings, but has recognition in the diplomatic sense, in the legal sense, because the single only element of justification in the Soviet portrayal of the resistance as being mere bandits, as Ambassador Kirkpatrick quoted, who have lost their "human aspect"--I think they mean "human soul"--the only element is that the military aid they receive is indeed covert.

REPRESENTATIVE WILSON: I didn't understand.

DR. LUTTWAK: The fact that the military aid sent to them is indeed covert. This furtive transfer of weapons in the shadows is not the mode in which one supports a cause that one is proud to support. Hence, I believe that your suggestion for the creation of a sort of quasi-governmental structure in Pakistan, which outside would then acquire

diplomatic forums of recognition and procedures--you spoke about the fact that the alliance in Afghanistan would have its own representation through consulates, you called them, indeed very specifically. I think these would be necessary steps towards eventually the fully fledged emergence of an Afghan provisional government outside Afghanistan which would be universally recognized and which would receive such aid as it receives openly, overtly--but, of course, as I am sure you realize, Congressman, the Pakistanis have to accept. All of this depends--your recommendation for building in Peshawar--on Pakistani acceptance of this.

Now, I do not see the Soviet Union putting overwhelming pressure on the Pakistani government to prevent the building and occupation of a small edifice with an Afghan flag on it. But I can assure you that as soon as this building begins to achieve its purpose of establishing recognition and so on, then the Soviet Union will correctly identify this as the ultimate threat.

The Soviet Union historically has expended enormous efforts to prevent the existence of any comparable bodies. During the 1920' and '30's, when the Soviet Union was not so well provided as it is provided today, it was really a very

major national effort they made to penetrate and destroy the various exile movements, the White Russian movements and so on, and the democratic Russian movements.

I think therefore your suggestion is valid. I agree with Ambassador Kirkpatrick that it is also urgent. It is urgent in the sense that it is already very belated.

REPRESENTATIVE WILSON: Yes, thank you. I'd like to follow through, Dr. Luttwak. Number one, I think it would take a group of extremely courageous KGB agents to infiltrate such a headquarters: their fate, if they were caught, would be fairly severe.

Do you agree with Ambassador Kirkpatrick that our embassy in Kabul serves very little purpose, as far as the United States is concerned?

DR. LUTTWAK: I regret I cannot, because I am not privy to the information that may be originating out of that facility. I just cannot say.

REPRESENTATIVE WILSON: Thank you very much.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Dr. Luttwak, I should apologize to you: things get out of sequence, and you didn't have an opportunity to offer an opening statement. Do you wish to give us your assessment?

DR. LUTTWAK: In view of the completeness of Ambassador Kirkpatrick's statement and, as always, its impressive quality, I would like to limit myself to a few specific remarks.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Fine.

DR. LUTTWAK: Your concern, Mr. Chairman, your specific concern, I believe, is that the United States is now in a sense participating--in a sense--in a negotiating process which is illegitimate to begin with because, indeed, the principal affected party, that is, the Afghan people, is not participating.

But, in a more functional sense, your concern is that we have got ourselves in a negotiating process in which we will end up, by the same processes that induced us to participate in the negotiations in the first place, namely, our generic belief in negotiations, with a particular need to maintain some coordination or closeness with Pakistan, which is under pressure; the same agencies that got us involved in the negotiation will continue to keep us in the negotiation until the negotiation finally will exit through the diplomatic tunnel, the tunnel, that is, where specialists and low-level officials are handling it--and when we come out of the

tunnel, we will find ourselves in a position where we would have to interrupt immediately, or at least before any assistance to the Afghan resistance, in exchange for a Soviet promise to withdraw at some point in the future.

Now, Ambassador Kirkpatrick noted, I think correctly, that when it comes to that final moment of decision, that decision indeed will have to be a presidential decision.

But I think your concern is a justified concern, because imagine the situation that will have then arrived: a negotiation will have happened, and then, at that point in time, if the President of the United States chooses to repudiate what is happening in effect, he will not only be overriding his own bureaucrats, which is something he can always do, but he would also be breaking with Pakistan, because our participation in this dynamic process of negotiations is a factor in the Pakistani role in it. As we go through the steps, the Pakistanis will be with the Soviet Union, and then the Soviet Union, regardless of what may otherwise happen in terms of arms supplies, will then have achieved a very important gain, namely, separating us from Pakistan.

Hence, the fact that the President's heart is in the right place is not in this instance a substitute for the

active implementation of a policy consistent with those beliefs that we all like to attribute to the President.

Now, let me stand back from this and make a couple of observations. In any negotiating situation, one has to ask one's self what is the end point. One will not tell the other party perhaps what our acceptable end point might be, but there has to be an end point. Now, there are many disagreements about what is happening or could happen in Afghanistan; there are many disagreements even, disagreements between us and the Soviets, needless to say--great disagreements. But I believe that every single person who has any sort of claim whatever, however shallow, to expertise in the subject would agree on one thing: that if the Soviet troops, the Soviet military forces--and we have to be careful with the Soviet Union, we will say all Russians in uniform or not, equipped with weapons, in large organized groups, even if they are wearing ill-fitting suits--if all such people leave Afghanistan, how long will a pro-Soviet, that is, a Babrak Karmal or successor, regime survive in Kabul? The answer is that it will not survive very long at all--perhaps a matter of days. And the fate of a DRA, so-called, a Soviet client Afghan--the fate of its leaders will be death at best.

Now, if that is what we can all agree on, that is, that no puppet regime could survive on its own, it therefore follows that the Soviet Union has no intention of withdrawing its forces, because withdrawal of its forces, even if the Afghan resistance is deprived of weapons, even if they were not to receive any military supplies at all, whatever military supplies they are left with would be quite sufficient to remove any regime left behind by the Soviet Union following the withdrawal of its troops. If the Afghan resistance were not only to be cut off but deprived of the weapons it already has in its hands, it would receive such weapons from the army and the guards of that pro-Soviet Afghan regime itself.

What I am telling you, therefore, is my belief that for the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan means creating a spectacle for the world, but primarily perhaps for their own central Asian populations, of the destruction of a pro-Soviet regime.

I do not believe that the Soviet Union in fact has any intention or that there is any consideration given whatsoever to the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan--until such time, in the next generation, that is, after the second millenium, 2000, whatever--until such time as their

long-term program of imperial absorption might have yielded its fruits in having brought into existence a new class of Afghan imperial citizens, Soviet Afghans, who can maintain control over a fundamentally changed Afghanistan.

I believe that when the Soviet Union decided to move into Afghanistan, they may have had all kinds of hopes about quickly knocking off opposition and putting in their own people. Once they decided to stay in, let's say into the sixth month of their presence, the die was cast: they made a decision to absorb Afghanistan.

And I have been trying to follow developments from a distance, and I have seen them follow a classic imperial strategy of absorption. The Soviet strategy in Afghanistan is the strategy which does not require them to control every square inch of the territory, or indeed any territory at all; it does not require them to defeat the enemy forces in the field. This is neither a classic military strategy nor a sort of big-war Clausewitzian strategy; it is an imperial strategy. And the way an empire converts rebellious lands into a tame province that pays taxes, yields recruits, and which has a ruling class that will control the province itself--the way you do that is by changing the population.

Some people you have to expel or kill, because they are irreconcilable.

In reducing the Afghan population quite drastically, the Soviet Union has also changed the composition of the Afghan population. Inevitably, more of the people who are more likely to resist, by age groups, by ethnic groups, have left than the ones that are less likely to resist.

And then you have to educate a class, a new class of Afghans, into the benefits of being collaborators with the Soviet imperial regime. And you can lure them in many different ways, including progress and advancement, which is on their side in this conflict.

So what I am saying, therefore, is that the Soviet Union is following a long-term imperial strategy of converting rebellious lands into a tame province.

I would now also like to point out that they have had a record of success in this. The people who rule the Soviet Union--and I don't mean just Mr. Gorbachev, whoever is at the very top, but the ruling class of the Soviet Union--would be justified to have a certain amount of pride: they have been the efficient preservers, they have been the prudent preservers and expanders of what is now the greatest

empire in the world, the only surviving empire of major dimensions--what happens to be the greatest empire in all of history, and not merely by geographic extent--which is true, as it happens--but in having more relative power than all other forces on this planet.

The people who are the prudent preservers of the greatest empire of all history know a thing or two about how to maintain empires. And what they know chiefly is that, in a difficult and harsh world, where nobody seems to love the Russian's, in a world that is so difficult and hostile to them because of the frustrations they have about things like the inability of their people to innovate scientifically, and all these difficulties--they know that they have one great source of help, succor, and protection: and that is the collaboration of the western powers.

The way that they have secured the eastern European empire, the docility of the eastern Europeans, is a function of the unalterable refusal of the western powers, that is, the United States and the countries in western Europe, to provide them with any encouragement at all to take a position other than a position of docility.

The reason why there are now negotiations around

Afghanistan is because the Afghan people are resisting.

There are no negotiations now over Czechoslovakia whereby we will agree to stop sending weapons to Czechoslovakia and they will agree to withdraw troops. There are no negotiations anywhere else. There are no negotiations because the countries of western Europe and the United States together are not willing to sustain the sacrifices and risk involved in sustaining a resistance.

Now, that being the case, it is only natural that the Soviet Union should try to transfer the very successful model of eastern Europe to the case of Afghanistan. Afghanistan will always be a troubled province, at least until the great program is accomplished of social and population change, 30 or 40 years down the road. But you can greatly reduce the problems if you can transfer the east European model.

The east European model would be to have Pakistan in the role of west Germany, a country eager above all to avoid trouble, and to have the United States in the role it has in west Germany, legitimately a guarantor of Pakistan independence--that is something the Soviet Union would be willing to accept for the time being--but which also would be

the guarantor of no revanchism. If you remember, the United States was both protecting the liberties of west Germany and, at the same time, guaranteeing the Soviet Union against the danger of an emergence of a Germany that wants to reconquer its lost territories and lost populations.

The parallel would be: the United States may continue to guarantee Pakistan, which is desirable in itself for the Soviet Union because it ensures the continued alliance with India, which will be lost by the Soviet Union should Pakistan not be there or not be guaranteed by the west. So they specifically want us to guarantee Pakistan, and, at the same time, to have Pakistan lighten that guarantee, as it were, by denying any possibility for the Afghans to continue resisting, at least not in any organized fashion.

That is the Soviet goal and model. Everything that has happened so far in regard to these negotiations supports their belief that indeed this may be accomplished.

That is why I regard these hearings as particularly important, because they achieve--I don't know how often this happens on Capitol Hill--but they achieve the purpose, I believe, hearings such as this, of illuminating the problem, uncovering it.

When you uncover this problem, I think you see the following. As you said, first, we have entered into negotiations where the chief party, the victim party, is absent. I mean, I kick you out of your house, you take refuge with the neighbor--you and your seventeen children move in with the neighbor; now I negotiate with your neighbor about the disposition of you and your seventeen children, while sitting in occupation of your house. You may imagine that the neighbor, however friendly, has interests of his own in this matter.

So I think that having entered into this process, we are now moving into the dark tunnel of detailed negotiation. And when you come out of that tunnel, the maximum Soviet goal would be to secure the transfer of the eastern European regime to Pakistan, that is, Pakistan as a well-protected country but which prevents any reaching Afghanistan itself--that would be the maximum Soviet goal. The minimum Soviet goal would be to separate the United States from Pakistan--and Pakistan, of course, is undergoing its own travails--and to divide them.

Now, the fact that the President's heart is in the right place guarantees us, I believe, for the time being, against the Soviet Union achieving its first and maximum

goal, of completely cutting off all aid to the Afghan resistance, while remaining in occupation, of course.

But even with the President's heart being in the right place, we are not guaranteed against the second goal, which is the division that will then occur. And that is why I think this hearing is very important, because interested parties, who may extend to many millions of Americans, may want to appreciate that the moment to intervene is now, because if we intervene any later there will be a tearing and a disruption of relations with Pakistan that may endanger the entire process.

I have sympathy for people who believe in negotiations--I don't like people who just believe in guns and so on. But in this case it was necessary to believe that the Soviet Union can withdraw from Afghanistan--under whatever circumstances, can. It is truly my belief that if you did conduct it as just a regular survey, you discover that the Soviet cannot withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, and will not do so until it has accepted to surrender the entirety of it, that is, to lose everything--the Soviet Union cannot keep something, namely, a complacent regime in Kabul.

So it will not withdraw until that day comes--and I

hope certainly the day will come--when the Soviet Union decides to give up the entirety of Afghanistan, swallowing the consequences. They are certainly not willing to do so now.

Thank you.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Thank you, Dr. Luttwak. Senator Wallop?

SENATOR WALLOP: Mr. Chairman, good morning, and good morning to my friends, Dr. Luttwak and Ambassador Kirkpatrick. It's nice to see you here. I have an opening statement which I will just insert for the record, but it does play off some of the things that both Ambassador Kirkpatrick and Dr. Luttwak have expressed here.

One of the themes is the double standard which seems to be so apparent in the Muslim world. The Muslim world is quick to decry the response to Libyan terrorism, but is virtually silent on the horrors inflicted upon fellow Muslims in Afghanistan.

I think when you are talking of the docility of eastern Europeans being a reflection of the docile view of the west towards supporting their aspirations--and one knows they are there, I mean one has only to look at the occasional

illuminations of it, in Poland, in Czechoslovakia, in Hungary, and others--but I think that this Arab reflection is one in which they have made an assessment of where power is and where fear needs to be respected. Because as I look, anyway, at how the Soviets might respond to what is essentially a real humiliation in Libya--the fact that they sort of stepped outside the circle of a friend's protection, their stated relationship--I see the only place for them to really sort of rise up and show us and the rest of the world who they are is probably Afghanistan and Pakistan.

My fear is that there will be a rather harsh response, escalation--there already is one in Afghanistan--but rather more harsh, coupled with some severe pressures, publicly visible worldwide, pressures on Pakistan just to sort of reassert the presence that is noticeably served by the fear expressed in Muslim reactions throughout the Arab world.

And, Ed, I agree with you that one of the results of an idea such as Representative Wilson's proposal, through building and sort of recognition of a regime in exile, if you will, is that we might conceivably get out of the western press this awesome word "rebel" which they keep using to describe the Afghan freedom fighters. It is such a

distortion. I mean, how can you be a rebel when you are in your own land fighting an outside force? And yet, as we are blessing, if you will, negotiations, as that process continues to separate the freedom fight from legitimate aspirations of indigenous people--the word "rebel" has virtually the imprimatur of the west and the United States--we would be then recognizing them as rebels--whether or not we continue to support them, we would legitimize that stamp. And there is something that wears in the human mind after a period of time--rebels are sort of not the people you invite into your home, for a rebel is sort of the troublemaker in the world, "rebel" is sort of the illegitimate aspect of world political friction.

And so I hope that maybe something that we could do would draw us back to where we could publicly reject that word and castigate a press which so freely uses it.

Then, lastly, I guess, because the President's heart is in the right place, one finds it difficult--nobody ever cleans the mirrors at the State Department, because they don't reflect often what the Commander in Chief, the President of the United States, does or says.

It is my guess that--and it's only a guess, but

it's a guess that is a reflection of events in other parts of the world--for example, intelligence agencies will tell you that our embassy in Managua is totally useless as far as quality intelligence goes, so it is basically the State Department which continues to use the intelligence as the means for keeping the State Department presence in Managua.

But I guess I worry even with those who are inclined towards negotiating paths. Ed, I agree with you: you would have first to suppose that the Soviets would have reason to or could leave, but, secondly, you would have to suppose that the Soviets would have reason to or could honor such an agreement if they made it. I think the events dealing with their most recent nuclear reactor show you just exactly how much they put in their international word.

By obligation, which they freely entered into, they were obliged to inform the rest of the world of that accident, its details and its threat, under the IAEA, and they did not. And once again it's a revelation that agreements with the Soviet Union are a matter of convenience, not obligation.

So it is important, I think, to view this precisely for what it is. I think it is a totally legitimate effort

for the United States to be involved in. I would agree with you that it ought to be an open effort. It is bizarrely open for something covert, and therefore ought to be owned up to in a proud statement on the part of the United States that this is what we are doing.

I am concerned still that what we are seeing isn't a change in policy but an absence of policy. I just don't think that we have yet decided what to do, and therefore we do a little bit of everything in the hopes that in some moment in time we will see an emerging event which we can live with--and the best we could expect would be something that we could live with, however humiliating that might be; it wouldn't be something that we created, it would be something that we ultimately absorbed.

I think that's dangerous. And I compliment you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, because I think that there is a possibility that from such hearings as this, such illuminations as this, might emerge a process by which a policy could be established. And I really do believe that there is not now a policy; I just believe it's a vacuum.

[The following statement was received for the record:

REPRESENTATIVE WILSON: Would the Senator yield?

SENATOR WALLOP: Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE WILSON: Senator, I agree with everything you say, except one thing--and I think this is important--and that is the double Moslem standard that you alluded to. I don't know whether you serve on committees that deal with this or not, but I don't know of any Moslem country, with the exception of Syria, that hasn't participated on behalf of the Mujahideen. That even includes Iran.

SENATOR WALLOP: That I would agree with, but there is another obligation, and that is a public statement of support. And no amount of covertness on the part of them will persuade Europeans, will persuade others in the world, that these are people with a legitimate cause who are being brutalized.

And one frankly would have to say that if the rest of the world is to continue to believe that the terror that it suffers is as a result of legitimate Muslim aspirations, then one would have to assume that legitimate Muslim aspirations would include a reaction of the Soviet Union for the kind of horrors it is inflicting upon a perfectly legitimate Muslim population.

So I guess what I am saying is that, absent their public outcry and absent some other kind of reaction, one can draw two conclusions, and that is that they are slightly frightened of a public expression; and two is--which is something that all of us have maintained for a long time--that terrorism has nothing to do with Palestinian or Muslim aspirations or anything else.

REPRESENTATIVE WILSON: I agree with that, Senator, but I would also say that if we do get in a position to recognize the regime in Peshawar, and if we do get in the position of having consulates, and if we do then get in a position of forcing a vote in the United Nations, those Muslim countries are going to have to decide which side they are on, because they are going to have to go public.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: This is an interesting side-light, but I don't want to get too out of focus.

Doctor?

DR. LUTTWAK: Just very quickly, there is nobody from the State Department here who could explain.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: They were invited, incidentally.

DR. LUTTWAK: I see. May I just suggest that the most plausible explanation would be for us to be involved in

this negotiation, which I think is illegitimate and dangerous--the most plausible justification for it will be that we must maintain fairly close to Pakistan--a country that, yes, we do support, but it's also the country that has to sustain all the pressures and dangers.

I would just like to point out that if that is the reason for remaining close now, that reason will continue to be operative. And it may force us to remain involved in the negotiating process in the same way, and therefore, if it is the calculation of the United States government that the position it should take now is to be a willing guarantor of an eventual settlement, I think it would be useful to have a consultation with Pakistan about defining exactly what they would ultimately accept, and to either express that intention, re-express, reiterate the expression of our willingness to guarantee, or withdraw as of now. A small bust-up is better than a big bust-up.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: That's very true. To back up just a little bit, I think the analogy with the dark tunnel is very apt. Indeed, this whole vital, important process is taking place in the dark among relatively low-level officials, and when the result pops out at the end of the tunnel,

I think the President is going to be very unpleasantly surprised and put in a position where he will have to back up publicly with great embarrassment, or acquiesce in a sell-out, what will result in a sell-out of the Afghan people and their monumental sacrifice.

May I ask that we kind of draw this thing together now, each of you. What have we done wrong so far in this negotiations process, and what do we do now to rectify it and to ensure that disaster doesn't result?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Senator Humphrey, I believe that a principal mistake in the negotiating process has been to participate in negotiations which do not meet the minimum standards set forth by the President of the United States, because when we do that it makes us seem not to be serious people. It makes it seem as though sober and in fact quite serious proposals of the President are not serious, but simply articulated for rhetorical effect.

We should not endorse one process and commit ourselves to one set of standards and then participate in negotiations which do not meet the minimum standards we have set forth.

I think that is the first point. And I believe that, beyond that, we should not say that we will not offer guarantees and then offer guarantees. That, again, makes us look as though we are not serious people in the negotiating process, and I think it has a negative impact on our ability to be effective in negotiations, not only these negotiations but all other negotiations involving the Soviet Union.

Third, I believe that we should under no circumstances underwrite in any way an agreement in which persons who are not the representatives of the Afghan people consign those people to conquest in an indefinite suffering under a government that rules by force. And I think we should give no legitimacy to any such settlement, and I believe we should be clearer perhaps than we are sometimes about what the nature of the process is--although, let me say, I think our government's record with regard to Afghanistan, the State Department's record even, is rather better than has been sometimes suggested here this morning--not perfect, by any means. But if you read, for example, the whole of the Deputy Secretary's speech at the conference which we attended last week, there is, I think, a fundamental rockbed realism about the nature of the devastation under way in Afghanistan and

about who is doing what to whom. I do not believe that our government is committed to guaranteeing a settlement which delivers the Afghan nation into permanent bondage, and I do not believe that our government will do that.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: There is no provision in any of the four documents, as far as we know, of a mechanism for self-determination.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Right.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Nor is it my impression that any such mechanism will be included in the documents.

Do you understand otherwise?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: No, I do not. Nothing of which I am aware today addresses the question of self-determination. And I do not in fact believe that there is any intention whatsoever on the part of the parties to the negotiations to provide self-determination to the Afghan people, frankly. But I leave open the possibility that I may just possibly be wrong.

We don't know, for example, what is happening today with Babrak Karmal; we don't know that there may not be some sort of concessions of which we do not even dream. I can only say it seems to me enormously improbable.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Should we guarantee agreements that do not contain a mechanism for self-determination?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: No, I don't think we should, I don't think we should at all. And I think we should face the fact that self-determination of a people requires democratic processes. Self-determination can only be expressed through democratic processes.

And I don't think we should ever betray our own national commitment to self-determination and government by consent by underwriting or guaranteeing any government which does not rest on those bases.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Dr. Luttwak, as you see it, what mistakes have we made and what do we do at this juncture to rectify them?

DR. LUTTWAK: Well, first of all, I think there are some mistakes we have not made. In the case of eastern Europe, we of course reject the principle of self-determination, and in the totality of our policy, we have, along with our European allies, taken the position that essentially there is a territorial demarcation, and we appreciate the fact that the entire regime in Europe is the rejection of self-determination.

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Now, in the case of Afghanistan we have not done that. It is true that we are not taking any steps to secure it, but there is a big difference--and the big difference is concretely expressed in the aid now being given to the resistance of the Afghan people.

[]

Now, one of the things that we have done right, I believe, by supremely efficient coordination between the State Department and gentlemen such as yourselves, has been that we have emulated the supreme artists, the Vietnamese, in this, because, as this negotiation has been unfolding, I understand from the newspapers that the aid levels have been increasing.

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So to vigorously increase the flow of arms and the level of military activity while engaging in talks, that is one good thing that indeed has happened. Indeed, I am sure that the best Soviet interpretation is that Senators Armstrong and Wallop and their colleagues, and Congressman Wilson and his colleagues, belong to a committee on which there are some people in the State Department--it's sort of a committee to fight a combined talk-fight strategy. So far, so good.

The problem is that, even as Ambassador Kirkpatrick

pointed out, the position of the State Department, as expressed most recently by Deputy Secretary Whitehead, is by no means a nefarious position. The only problem has to do with the dynamic process of a negotiation.

Now, so far, that dynamic process has been associated with an increased level of U. S. assistance, and, as I understand from the newspapers once again, the possibility of some qualitative improvements in the forms of military assistance. And if we continue in this vein, subject to that clear definition that I believe is necessary, and immediately necessary side negotiation with Pakistan about exactly where the boundaries are [inaudible]--subject to that, this thing might turn out very well indeed.

So I don't see it in terms of mistakes. We have reason to be very concerned for the reasons that we discussed at the beginning of this hearing, and you pointed out. At the same time, we shouldn't be terribly gloomy about what has happened.

I would suggest that this secret committee of yours--you know, Senators Wallop, Armstrong, Charlie Wilson, with State Department underlings, as we have rather rudely called them--which has done this thing so well, you might

care to retain some of these Vietnamese as consultants--I myself am a consultant, I have a certain solidarity--on how to do this, because that is how it was done to us. Let us do unto others as was done unto us in this matter.

Thank you.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Before I turn to Congressman Wilson--I know he is anxious to follow up--let me just touch on this embassy business in Kabul. That has concerned me, because I consider our presence there, the American flag flying in Kabul, the seat of this criminal puppet government, undercuts our moral position. Incidentally, the DRA has an embassy here as well, and I have tried to make the case from an operational standpoint that the intelligence we derive from our facility in Kabul does not warrant the undercutting of our moral position. And yet the bureaucracy replies, well, we don't really recognize the DRA government, that we have no direct contacts with them.

What are your opinions on this? If the American flag is flying at a building which we call the embassy, does that imply that we recognize the government whose seat that is, Madam Ambassador?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: That's my understanding.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: So, in your view, we recognize the DRA government by our embassy and the flying of the American flag?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: That's my understanding. Well, by the whole process of not only flying the American flag, but accrediting diplomatic personnel, we recognize the country. That's my understanding, certainly.

DR. LUTTWAK: I believe that the term "embassy" specifically is connected with recognition. It is an "embassy to." If you wish to have a building with as many flags as you wish on it of your own anywhere and you do not wish to recognize, then you have to call it a consulate or a legation. A consulate does not express recognition; an embassy does. And that is its only meaning.

REPRESENTATIVE WILSON: I think, Senator, on that point--and I think we all agree--the present so-called ambassador to the United States has presented his credentials to the President of the United States. Unless those credentials are returned, then he has credentials as the ambassador from that country.

DR. LUTTWAK: Which means, of course, that in law, then, indeed the resistance is qualified as "rebel," by

definition. If that is the government, the opponents must be rebels.

May I suggest, Senator, that you simply ask a legal opinion of this from the excellent legal advisor of the State Department, a wonderful man--just ask him for a legal opinion: Is the embassy recognition or not? If so, then Pravda's insults are not justified, but its formal definition of these people as "bandits" would then be appropriate.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: It seems to me, among other things, it's very difficult for us to persuade Pakistan not to recognize the DRA when we have in effect done it ourselves.

Congressman Wilson?

REPRESENTATIVE WILSON: I really don't have any more questions. I am not as pessimistic as the news reports of the last two weeks concerning Soviet successes. I think they have taken an enormous number of casualties. I don't the figures that Senator Bradley used--these are just general statements, Senator--I don't think the figures that Senator Bradley used are accurate at all concerning the number of Russian troops that are actively engaged in Afghanistan; I think there are many more. Some of them may be sitting over

in Russia fixing to go in the next day, but I think there are many more. I think the war is much more expensive to them.

I am of the opinion strongly that if the United States does not lose its nerve, sooner or later the Soviets are going to have to quit.

I couldn't agree more with you and with the thrust of these hearings; I compliment you for them. I personally could not accept an agreement that the Mujahideen or the alliance was not a party to, and I think that further fits the idea of creating a dignity of a force in being, of a government in being. I can think of nothing I would enjoy more than seeing the United Nations vote and watching some of the Moslem countries having to vote either for what they know is an illegitimate, non-Moslem puppet government of the great godless entity of the north or voting for their Moslem brothers. I am sure Ambassador Kirkpatrick would enjoy watching those hands go up or down, as the case may be.

But mostly I want to thank you, I want to thank Dr. Luttwak, I want to thank Ambassador Kirkpatrick. All we have to do is be steady in the boat, and this is going to come out all right.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: I want to thank our witnesses,

Ambassador Kirkpatrick, Dr. Luttwak, and Senator Bradley.

The whole purpose here and the timing is to open up this dark tunnel, and I think we have succeeded in that--to what degree only time will tell.

But thank you all very much.

[Applause]

[The hearing concluded at 11:02 a.m.]